they might be required at short notice to remove themselves to Vichy, presumably with essential documents and cash reserves, if any.

IV

As he walked away from signing the Treaty of Versailles, Clemenceau mournfully remarked: 'I fear a peace without victory, just as we had a victory without peace/ in that showing a clear understanding of the impossible task which had been set —to establish peace on the foundations of a victory, to safeguard a victory without jeopardising peace. The two— peace and victory, were incompatible and mutually destructive. What strengthened the one weakened the other, and *vice versa.* Put together, they made an explosive mixture, which, exploding, must destroy both; leave neither peace nor victory.

The League was intended to make possible everlasting victory by ensuring everlasting peace. Other associated devices, with the same objective, were suggested or tried out as its weakness became apparent. Briand circulated to all European Governments a project for a United States of Europe, his communication being in each case politely acknowledged; and Litvinov indefatigably laboured at constructing a system of non-aggression pacts; some of these being actually concluded and ceremonially signed. Occasionally the President of the United States or a member of his administration participated, sending across the Atlantic to all heads of States messages calling upon them to live at peace as good neighbours should; and an

American journalist, Mr. Clarence K. Streit, disillusioned by some years of reporting the League's activities, put forward a proposal for a federation of democracies,[10] which, according to Sir Norman Angell, Mr. Lionel Curtis and others, marked a milestone in history, and which left a small deposit in the shape of an organisation called Federal Union, with an office and officers and headed note-paper, one among many such. Like a jig-saw puzzle, pieces signifying

[10] See *Union Now* by Clarence K. Stxeit.